This paper considers a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with model uncertainty. The drift term in the dynamics of the agents contains a common unknown function. We take a robust optimization approach where a representative agent in the limiting model views the drift uncertainty as an adversarial player. By including the mean field dynamics in an augmented state space, we solve two optimal control problems sequentially, which combined with consistent mean field approximations provides a solution to the robust game. A set of decentralized control strategies is derived by use of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) and shown to be a robust ε-Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
Mean field game theory provides an effective methodology for the analysis and strategy design in a large population of players which are individually insignificant but collectively have strong impact (see e.g. [24, 27, 28, 34] ). A typical modeling analyzes a system of N players with mean field coupling in their dynamics or costs, or both. The linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework is of particular interest since it allows an explicit solution procedure. Consider a large population of N agents. The dynamics of agent i are given by the stochastic differential equation (SDE) dx i (t) = (Ax i (t) + Bu i (t) + Gx (N ) (t))dt + DdW i (t),
where x (N ) = (1/N ) N i=1 x i denotes the mean field coupling term. The cost of agent i is given by
where we denote |z| Q = (z T Qz) 1 2 and the symmetric matrices Q ≥ 0, H ≥ 0 and R > 0. The LQG modeling framework was first developed in [24, 27] to obtain a set of strategies (û 1 , . . . ,û N ) such that eachû i only uses the local sample path information of x i and some deterministic functions reflecting the collective behavior of the agents and such that (û 1 , . . . ,û N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium. There has existed a substantial body of literature adopting the LQG framework [4, 7, 31, 35, 43, 47] .
For further literature, the reader is referred to [12, 13, 14, 20, 28, 32] for nonlinear diffusion based games and the associated SDE analysis, [11, 34] for study of the coupled system of Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck equations, [6, 9, 26, 41, 42] for models containing a major player, [8, 18] for time consistent strategies in mean field games, [52] for mean field oscillator games, [50] for Markovian switching mean field games, [15] for application to Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium models, and [1] for a related solution notion called stationary equilibrium where players optimize assuming a steady-state long-run average for the empirical distribution of others' states. For an overview on mean field game theory, see [6, 10, 21] .
Within the traditional research on games, there has existed a fair amount of literature on model uncertainty. For an N player static game with finite action spaces and an uncertain payoff matrix, a robust-optimization equilibrium is introduced in [2] where each player optimizes its worst case payoff with respect to the uncertain set. A similar method is applied to hierarchical static games [22] . Robustness has been addressed in dynamic games as well. A linear-quadratic (LQ) game with system parameter uncertainties is presented in [29] , and the deviation from the Nash equilibrium is estimated for a set of nominal strategies. Robust Nash equilibria are analyzed in [49] for an LQ game with an unknown time-varying disturbance signal as an adversarial player. In the first case, a soft-constrained game is solved where the cost includes a quadratic penalty term for the disturbance. The second case introduces a hard constraint by specifying an L 2 bound on the disturbance function. The work [30] deals with stochastic games where the payoff and state transition probabilities contain uncertainty. The solution is developed by letting each player solve a robust Markov decision problem to optimize its worst case cost while other players' strategies are fixed.
This paper aims to address model uncertainty in the mean field LQG game context. Specifically, we focus on drift uncertainty by adding to (1) a common unknown L 2 -disturbance f . A practical motivation is that in many decision problems, a large number of agents can share a common uncertainty source fluctuating with time, and examples include taxation, subsidy, interest rates, and so on. A direct consequence of our modeling is that this disturbance has global influence on the population. To address robustness, each agent locally views the disturbance as an adversarial player, and for this purpose we incorporate into (2) an effort penalty term for the disturbance which in turn maximizes the resulting cost first. The agent minimizes subsequently. The framework of letting the disturbance maximize while its effort is penalized is called the soft-constraint approach [5, 19, 49] . It has the advantage of analytical tractability. When a hard constraint is considered, the robust mean field game is more difficult to tackle; see some preliminary analysis in [25] . Regarding robustness in mean field games, a related work is [46] where each agent is paired with its local disturbance as an adversarial player. The resulting solution is to replace the usual HJB equation by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation in the solution.
To design the individual strategies it is necessary to build the dynamics of the mean field (i.e. state average of the agents) evolving under the disturbance. This technique shares its spirit with the state augmentation method in major player models [26, 41, 42] . The subsequent robust optimization problem, as a minimax control problem, leads to two optimal control problems with indefinite state weights [51] . They are different from the well known stochastic control problems with indefinite control weights [17, 37] . We will follow a convex optimization approach to solve the two control problems via variational analysis and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) [23, 40, 44] . Both the information structure and the solution procedure for our model are different from [46] where each player and its local disturbance have access to its state and so dynamic programming is applicable. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We formulate a class of mean field LQG games where the players face a common uncertainty source, and introduce the robust optimization approach to solve two convex optimal control problems.
• Decentralized strategies are obtained for the robust mean field game via a set of FBSDE.
• The performance of the decentralized strategies for the N players is characterized as a robust ε-Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mean field LQG game with a common disturbance and defines the worst case cost for a player. Section 3 studies the limiting robust optimization problem which leads to two optimal control problems solved sequentially by the disturbance and the representative player. The solution equation system of the mean field game is obtained in Section 4 based on consistent mean field approximations. A key error estimate of the mean field approximation is developed in Section 5. Section 6 characterizes the set of decentralized strategies as a robust ε-Nash equilibrium. An extension of the analysis to players with random initial states is presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Mean Field LQG Games with Drift Uncertainty
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for T > 0. Suppose that (Ω, F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P) is a complete filtered probability space. Throughout this paper, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, R n×k the set of all n × k matrices. We use | · | to denote the norm of a Euclidean space, or the Frobenius norm for matrices. For a vector or matrix M ,
Throughout the paper, we use C (or C 1 , C 2 , . . .) to denote a generic constant which does not depend on the population size N and may vary from place to place.
The game with a finite population
Consider N agents (or players) denoted by A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , respectively. The state x i of A i is R n -valued and satisfies the linear SDE
where
The control u i takes its value in R n 1 . The R n 2 -valued standard Brownian motions {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } are independent. The initial states {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } are deterministic and their empirical mean has the limit lim
We take {F t } 0≤t≤T as the natural filtration generated by the N n 2 -dimensional Brownian motion (W 1 (t), . . . , W N (t)), and F = F T . The admissible control set U of A i is
Denote u = (u 1 , . . . , u N ) and
The function f ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R n ) is an unknown disturbance to characterize the model uncertainty, and represents an influence from the common environment for decision-making. A natural motivation for considering deterministic disturbance is the following. Although each player A i regards the disturbance as adversarial, it should not be excessively pessimistic by assuming that the latter will use the sample path information of W i to play against it, and instead only considers a deterministic f .
The cost functional of A i is
where the symmetric matrices Q ≥ 0, R > 0, H ≥ 0 and the constant γ > 0. We assume uniform agents in the sense that they share the same parameter datum (A, B, G, D; Γ, η, Q, R, γ, H). Also, to simplify the analysis, we consider constant parameters. Due to the unknown function f , A i cannot evaluate its cost even if all control policies (u 1 , . . . , u N ) are known. To address this indeterminacy, we approach the game from a robust optimization point of view where each agent takes f as an adversarial player. Here a soft-constraint [5, 49, 19] for the disturbance is adopted in that the term − 1 γ |f (t)| 2 is included in (4) while f attempts to maximize. For given (u i , u −i ), define the worst case cost of A i as
A set of strategies (û 1 , . . . ,û N ) is a robust ε-Nash equilibrium for the N players if for ε ≥ 0,
Our central objective is to design decentralized strategies based on the above solution notion.
The Limiting Robust Optimization Problem
We start by making an appropriate approximation of the coupling term x (N ) . Adding up the N equations in (3) and normalizing by 1/N , we obtain
where u (N ) = (1/N ) N j=1 u j . Intuitively, from the point of view of A i , u (N ) may be approximated by a deterministic functionū. Moreover, when N → ∞, (1/N ) N j=1 dW j vanishes due to the law of large numbers. In turn, a deterministic function m can be used to approximate x (N ) . The above reasoning suggests to introduce the limiting ordinary differential equation (ODE)
The limiting model of the mean field game
Consider the optimization problem of a representative agent A i :
where the second equation is motivated from (6) and m i (0) = m 0 . For the limiting model (7), (W i , x i (0)) is the same as in (3). We reuse (x i , A i ) to denote the state and the corresponding agent. This shall cause no risk of confusion. Since f will be determined as its worst case form depending on x i (0), m i is associated with the agent index i so that it is ready as an appropriate notation for the subsequent closed-loop dynamics. The cost functional is given bȳ
We aim to find a solution pair (f ,û i ) such that
Finally, we need a consistency condition, i.e., 1 N N i=1û i converges toū in some sense (this will be made precise in Section 4) and we look forū ∈ C([0, T ]; R n 1 ); the feasibility of doing so will be clear from our solution procedure. The next part of our plan is to show that such strategies have the property in (5) when applied in the game of N agents. In the following, we solve the optimization problem (8) in two steps.
The control problem with respect to the disturbance
Clearly ( P1) is equivalent to the following problem
(P1a) is an optimal control problem with negative semi-definite state weights. We are interested in the situation where (P1a) is a strictly convex problem with a coercivity property. This ensures that the worse case disturbance is uniquely determined by A i . The procedure below to identify conditions for ensuring convexity is similar to [37] .
To study the convexity ofJ ′ i in f , we construct a simpler auxiliary optimal control problem. Denote
Consider the dynamicsż
where g ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R n ). The optimal control problem is
For any s ∈ R, we haveJ ′′ i (sg) = s 2J ′′ i (g), and so viewJ ′′ i as a quadratic functional of g.
for all g, F is said to be positive semi-definite. If furthermore, F (g) > 0 for all g = 0, F is said to be positive definite.
is convex (resp., strictly convex) in f if and only ifJ ′′ i (g) is positive semi-definite (resp., positive definite).
Proof. Let (x i , m i ) and (x ′ i , m ′ i ) be the state processes of (7) corresponding to (u i , f ) and (u i , f ′ ), respectively. Take any λ 1 ∈ [0, 1] and denote λ 2 = 1 − λ 1 . Then
Denote g = f − f ′ , and z = x i − x ′ i . Therefore, z is deterministic and satisfies (10) . In addition,
and the lemma follows.
For our further existence analysis, we need to ensureJ ′ i (u i , f ) to be both strictly convex and coercive in f . For this purpose, we introduce the following assumption.
(H1) There exists a small ǫ 0 > 0 such thatJ
Note that (H1) is completely determined by the parameters ( Q, γ, ǫ 0 , H, T ), and does not depend on u i . Concerning (H1), we have the following result.
Proposition 3
The following statements are equivalent:
(ii) The Riccati equatioṅ
has a unique solution on
Proof. In fact, (H1) is the uniform convexity condition proposed in [45] , and the equivalence between (i) and (ii) is a corollary of Theorem 4.6 of [45] . Moreover, (iii) =⇒ (ii) is given in Theorem 4.3 of [40] . On the other hand, (ii) =⇒ (iii) is implied by Theorems 2.7 and 2.9 of [54] .
For illustration of condition (ii), we give the following example.
Example 4 Consider system (3)-(4) with parameters A = 0.5, B = 1, G = 0.25, Q = 1, Γ = 0.8, R = 1.5, H = 0, γ = 1. Denote A = A + G. We solve (11) to obtain
By the local Lipschitz continuity property of the vector field in (11), P (t) is the unique solution.
Note that (11) is not a standard Riccati equation since the state weight matrix − Q is not positive semidefinite. In general, the solvability of (11) cannot be ensured on an arbitrary time horizon. Condition (iii) enables us to determine the solvability of (11) Lemma 6 Assume (H1).
Following the method in proving Lemma 2, we can further show
By (7) and direct estimates, we can show
where the constant
Consequently, for f L 2 ≥ 1, (14) gives
Theorem 7 Suppose that (H1) holds and let u i ∈ U andū be fixed. Then
where m i (0) = m 0 and p i (T ) = HEx i (T ), and furthermoref = γp i .
Proof. (i) By Lemma 2,J ′
i is strictly convex and coercive. In addition,J ′ i is continuous in f . Hence there exists a uniquef such thatJ [39] . (ii) We start by establishing existence. Let the optimal state-control pair be denoted by (x i , m i ,f ), which is uniquely determined. We have the relation
where m i (0) = m 0 . By using (x i , m i ), we obtain a unique solution p i froṁ
where p i (T ) = HEx i (T ). Now we consider another control f =f +f ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R n ) in place off . Letx i andm i be the first variations of x i and m i , respectively, which result from the variationf forf . Then we havex i =m i for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
SinceJ ′ i has a minimum at (x i , m i ,f ), the first variation of the cost satisfies
On the other hand,
Integrating both sides of (20) and invoking (19), we obtain
Recalling p i (T ) = HEx i (T ), sincef is arbitrary, it follows from (21) that (16)- (18) is a solution to (15) .
We proceed to show uniqueness. Suppose that (
It is straightforward to show that the first variation ofJ ′ i at the state control pair (
is the unique optimal statecontrol pair and so coincides with (x i , m i ,f ) where (x i , m i ) is the optimal state process determined from (16)- (18) . This further implies p ′ i = p i . So uniqueness follows. The last part of (ii) is now obvious.
The control problem of player A i
Assume that (H1) holds. This will ensure that all the equation systems in this section have a well defined solution. The dynamics are given by
where m i (0) = m 0 and p i (T ) = HEx i (T ). The optimal control problem is
Here we have takenf u i = γp i which depends on u i . We may simply writeJ i (u i ). This is again a linear quadratic optimal control problem with indefinite weight for the state vector (x i , m i , p i ). Note that a perturbation in u i will cause a change of the mean term Ex i . So this is essentially a mean field type optimal control problem; see related work [3, 53] . We continue to identify conditions under which (P2) is strictly convex and coercive. These conditions will be characterized by using an auxiliary control problem with dynamics
We may view this as a deterministic optimal control problem with two point boundary value conditions for the state trajectory. We sayJ a i is positive semi-definite ifJ a i (ν i ) ≥ 0 for all ν i ; if furthermore, J a i (ν i ) > 0 whenever ν i = 0, we sayJ a i is positive definite. In order to have a well defined optimal control problem, we need to show that (23) has a unique solution.
Proof. Indeed, by taking u i = 0 and
i − x 0 i is deterministic. If there exist two different solutions to (23) for some ν i , then we can construct two different solutions to (22) for a given u i , which is a contradiction to Theorem 7.
Lemma 9J i (u i ) is convex (resp., strictly convex) in u i ∈ U if and only ifJ a i (ν i ) is positive semidefinite (resp., positive definite).
Proof. See appendix A.
We introduce the following assumption.
Representation of the quadratic functional
We intend to find an expression ofJ a i (ν i ) so that (H2) can be characterized in a more explicit form. A change of coordinates will make the computation more convenient. Definež
wherež(0) = z(0) = 0 and q(T ) = H(ž(T ) + z(T )).
Define the Hamiltonian matrix
and the matrix ODEΦ(t) = HΦ(t) where Φ(0) = I. Denote the partition
where each submatrix Φ ij is an n × n matrix function. We havež
By solving (z, q) in (25), we obtain
where q(0) is to be determined. At the terminal time,
where the second equality is due to the terminal condition of q. It follows that
Proposition 10 If (H1) holds,
Proof. Under (H1), (25) has a unique solution by Lemma 8, and accordingly, q(0) is uniquely determined. If Φ 22 (T ) − HΦ 12 (T ) is singular, we may find two different solutions of q(0) from (27) which further give two different solutions to (25) , leading to a contradiction. Hence, Φ 22 − HΦ 12 (T ) is nonsingular.
By solving q(0) in (27) and further eliminatingž, we write z and q as integrals depending on ν i . Define the linear operator
By standard estimates we can show that L is a linear and bounded operator from
It can be shown that L T is a linear and bounded operator from L 2 (0, T ; R n 1 ) to R n . Let L * T be its adjoint operator. NowJ a i may be represented in terms of the inner product on L 2 (0, T ; R n 1 ):
(ii) (H2) holds if and only if there exists δ 0 > 0 such that
Proof. (i) follows from Lemma 9 and the representation (28). (ii) follows from (28).
The criterion in part (ii) of Proposition 11 still involves the operators Θ and Θ T on an infinite dimensional space. Here we give a sufficient condition to endure (H2) based on some more computable parameters. It is clear that (
For simplicity, we only consider the case H = 0, and simple computations lead to
|e As B|ds and b 5 = sup 0≤t≤T |e At B|. By exchanging the order of integration in q 1 and q 2 , it is easy to show
which further gives
For the case H = 0, (H2) holds whenever R > γC q I.
The solution of (P2)
Letū ∈ C([0, T ]; R n 1 ) be fixed.
Lemma 12 Assume (H1)-(H2). Then (P2) has a unique optimal state-control pair of the form
where p i (T ) = HEx i (T ). Furthermore, the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
has a unique solution
) and
Proof. Under (H2), by adapting Lemma 9 to the auxiliary control problem with cost functional
By the method in proving Lemma 6, we can further show thatJ i is strictly convex and coercive in u i . Hence (P2) has a unique optimal state-control pair ( (31) is a standard linear BSDE and so has a unique solution (y i , ζ i ). Further define the BSDE
where y(T ) = 0. It also has a unique solution (y, ζ) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R 2n ). It can be checked that
and E(y(T ) + y i (T )) + p i (T ) = 0. So (30) , and the resulting solution be denoted by (x i +x i , m i +m i , p i +p i ), which exists and is unique by Theorem 7. It follows that
By applying Ito's formula tox T i y i , we obtain
Similarly,
Therefore, adding up the two equations yields
By (34) and (35),
Note that by (33),
Hence,
, and y i (T ) = −Hx i (T ). This equation system consists of 2 forward equations and 2 backward equations. It is clear that the solution of the optimal control problem (P2) satisfies the above FBSDE. A natural question is whether this FBSDE's solution completely determines the optimal control. This is answered by the next theorem. Denote
Theorem 13 Assume (H1)-(H2). Then the FBSDE (36) has a unique solution (x i , m i , p i , y i , ζ i ) ∈ S[0, T ] and the optimal control for (P2) is given byû i = R −1 B T y i .
Proof. We solve (P1) first and (P2) next to determineû i . By Lemma 12, we obtain (
We continue to show uniqueness. Suppose that (
, and y i (T ) = −Hx i (T ).
As in the proof of Lemma 12, we evaluate the first variation ofJ i (u i ) at (x i , m i , p i ,ǔ i ) and can show δJ i = 0. SinceJ i is convex, this zero first variation condition implies thatǔ i is an optimal control of (P2). By the same reasoning, u ′ i is also an optimal control. By strict convexity, we haveǔ i = u ′ i . Subsequently, we have (
The Solution of the Robust Game
Note that Theorem 13 determines the strategy of a representative agent whenū is fixed. Denote
By (36), we obtain
and y (N ) (T ) = −Hx (N ) (T ).
As an approximation to (39), we construct the following limiting system
(T ) = Hx(T ), and y(T ) = −Hx(T ). This is a two point boundary value problem.
Note that y is intended as an approximation of y (N ) when N → ∞. The consistency requirement
Under the condition (41), the first two equations in (40) coincide to give x = m for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, we eliminate the equation of x and introduce the new system     ṁ
where m(0) = m 0 , p(T ) = Hm(T ), and y(T ) = −Hm(T ). This is still a two point boundary value problem. The next corollary follows from Theorem 13.
Corollary 14 Assume (H1)-(H2). Suppose that (42) has a unique solution
(m, p, y) ∈ C 1 ([0, T ]; R 3n ) and takeū = R −1 B T y in (36). Then (36) has a unique solution (x i , m i , p i , y i , ζ i ) ∈ S[0, T ].
The special case of same initial conditions
Consider the special case where all agents have the same initial condition x i (0) = m 0 for all i ≥ 1. The FBSDE (36) defines a mapping
where we takeū ∈ C([0, T ]; R n 1 ). Clearly R −1 B T Ey i is a continuous R n 1 -valued function of t ∈ [0, T ].
By the consistency requirementū = Λ(ū), we setū = R −1 B T Ey i in the second equation of (36) to obtain the equation system of the mean field game:
, and y i (T ) = −Hx i (T ). An interesting fact is that the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (43) is completely determined by the ODE system (42) without further using (H1)-(H2). 
Existence of a solution to (42)
To study the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (42), we use a fixed point approach and introduce the equation system     ṁ
where h ∈ C([0, T ]; R n ), m(0) = m 0 , p(T ) = Hm(T ), and y(T ) = −Hm(T ). The next lemma identifies a sufficient condition for (44) to have a unique solution for any h ∈ C([0, T ]; R n ).
Lemma 16 Suppose that the Riccati equatioṅ
has a unique solution on [0, T ]. Then (44) defines a mapping from C([0, T ]; R n ) to itself:
Proof. We write p = −Km + φ for (44) and obtain the ODĖ
It follows thatṁ = (A + G − γK)m + h + γφ.
Let the fundamental solution matrices of the two ODEṡ
be Φ(t, s) and Ψ(t, s), respectively, with Φ(s, s) = Ψ(s, s) = I. Then Ψ(t, s) = Φ T (s, t). We obtain
This in turn gives
We further solve
which implies y ∈ C([0, T ]; R n ). The lemma follows.
To simplify the existence analysis for (42) in this section, we consider the case H = 0. Below Υ k denotes a continuous function of t which does not depend on h and can be easily determined. Consequently,
It is clear that Λ 0 is from C([0, T ]; R n ) to itself.
Define the constants 
then (42) has a unique solution.
Proof. For each t,
Hence, Λ 1 is a contraction and has a unique fixed point. So (42) has a unique solution.
The constants c 1 , . . . , c 4 in (46) Remark 1 For the two-point boundary value problem, the contraction estimate in the fixed point method may be conservative and typically works on small time intervals for the solvability of (42) (see, e.g., Ch.1, Sec. 5, [40] ).
We continue to derive another condition under which (42) is solvable without restriction to a small time horizon. To this end, we first rewrite (42) in the following form:
Then, by the variation of constant formula, we have 
where Θ(t) = e At and p, y have the initial conditions p(0) = µ, y(0) = ν. Noting the terminal condition in (47), now we present the following result. For illustration, we give the following example.
Example 20 Consider system (3)- (4) with all parameters being scalar-valued and Γ = 1, H = 0. We calculate
where A is defined in Proposition 3. By direct computations, we obtain Note that the solvability of (42) in Example 20 does not depend on the value of R −1 B 2 , which is different from the condition in Theorem 17.
Error Estimate of the Mean Field Approximation
We suppose that (42) has a unique solution (m, p, y) and accordingly takeū in (36) as
The FBSDE system (36) now becomes
, and y i (T ) = −Hx i (T ). By Corollary 14, this FBSDE has a unique solution. In the game of N players, let y i be solved from (50) and denote the control for A i byû
which is a well defined process in L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ). Forû (N ) = (1/N ) N i=1û i , we aim to estimate
Note thatû 1 , . . . ,û N are independent, but they are not necessarily with the same distribution due to possibly different initial states of the agents. This fact will somehow complicate our error estimate. The key result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 21
Assume that (H1)-(H2) hold and that (42) has a unique solution. We have
The proof of Theorem 21 is provided in the remaining part of this section. To do this, we need to prove some lemmas under the assumption of the theorem. Recalling (38), we takeū =ū * in (39) to write
, and y N (T ) = −Hx N (T ). The initial condition x N (0) is different from that of (40).
Lemma 22 (53) has a unique solution which can be denoted as
Proof. Existence follows by taking expectation in (52) . To show uniqueness, suppose that (53) has two different solutions (
satisfies (36) , which is a contradiction to Theorem 13. Uniqueness follows.
Lemma 23
We have
By (52), (53) and Lemma 22,
where θ 1 (0) = 0 and θ 2 (T ) = −Hθ 1 (T ).
Let P be the solution of the Riccati equatioṅ
Denote θ 2 = −P θ 1 + ψ, where ψ(T ) = 0. This gives the equation
where ψ(T ) = 0. There is a unique solution ψ = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies
Hence, sup 0≤t≤T E|θ 1 (t)| 2 = O(1/N ). The lemma follows since θ 2 = −P θ 1 .
When (m, p, y) is a unique solution of (42), it can be shown that (x, m, y, p) := (m, m, y, p) is a unique solution of (40) under the condition (41).
Lemma 24 We have
where h 1 (0) is given, h 2 (0) = 0, h 3 (T ) = Hh 1 (T ), and h 4 (T ) = −Hh 1 (T ). It is constructed as a homogeneous version of (53) . We claim that (54) has a unique solution for any given value of h 1 (0). If this were not true, there would exist h(0) such that (54) has multiple solutions which, in turn, can be used to construct multiple solutions to (53) . This would give a contradiction to Lemma 22. It is clear that
is a solution of (54) with
. . e n be a canonical basis of R n . For h 1 (0) = e k , we obtain a solution of (54), denoted
. Let (z) k be the kth component of a vector z. We may uniquely denote (x N − x, m N − m, p N − p, y N − y) as a linear combination of h 1 , . . . , h n :
The lemma follows readily.
Proof of Theorem 21. Forū =ū * , we writeû
The second inequality follows from Lemmas 22 and 23, and the last step follows from Lemma 24.
Robust Nash Equilibrium
Throughout this section, we assume that (42) has a unique solution and takeū =ū * determined by (49) . For f ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R n ) and u i ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , recall the worst case cost
It is clear that for each i and any
Consider the set of strategies (û i ,û −i ) given by (51) for a population of N players with dynamics (3). It should be emphasized that we only use (50)- (51) to make a well defined processû i in L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ) which should not be understood as a feedback strategy. The main result of this section is the next theorem which characterizes the performance of this set of strategies. (û 1 , . . . ,û N ) given by (51) is a robust ε N -Nash equilibrium for the N players, i.e.,
The rest part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 25. For any given f ∈ L 2 (0, T ; R n ), denote the state processes of (3) corresponding to (
All subsequent lemmas are proved under the assumptions of Theorem 25.
Lemma 26
Proof. Note that
By linear SDE estimates,
By Theorem 21, the lemma follows.
Lemma 27 There exists a constantĈ 0 independent of N such that
where x ′ i (0) = x i (0). By Lemma 26, it is easy to show
Combining Lemma 6 with condition (ii) in Theorem 25, we obtain
where the second inequality follows from elementary estimates based on the solutions of (56) and (57).
Finally combining (58)-(61) with Lemma 26 leads to
The lemma follows.
Consider the set of strategies (u i ,û −i ) and the corresponding state processes
where (x 1 , · · · , x N ) is generated by (u i ,û −i ) and f . Taking f = 0, we obtain
Therefore, (64) holds.
Let UĈ 1 denote the set of processes u i ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ) which satisfy (64). For (62)- (63), denote
Proof. Rewrite (62) in the form
By (63) and (65),
which combined with (56) gives
By Theorem 21 and the fact E
, where the constants C do not depend on (f, u i ), elementary SDE estimates lead to
where C does not depend on u i . The lemma follows.
Lemma 30 For each
is finite and attained by some f depending on u i and so denoted as f u i . Moreover,
wheref u i is determined by Theorem 7 for the given u i .
Proof. Note that we have 
We have the relation
where C doest not depend on u i . We have
where C does not depend on (N, u i ). So for given u i ∈ UĈ 1 , J i (u i ,û −i , f ) attains a finite supreme at some f u i since it is a continuous functional of f , and by (71) we may further find a constantĈ 2 such that
By (69),
Now for u i ∈ UĈ 1 and the resulting f u i satisfying (72), we further obtain
wheref u i is determined by Theorem 7. Due to (70),
for some constant C. By (74) and the method in (68), we similarly derive
Hence, for all u i ∈ UĈ
The constant C in various places does not depend on u i . The lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 25. It suffices to show the first inequality by checking u i ∈ UĈ
1
. By Lemma 30, we have
On the other hand, by taking the particular controlû i in Lemma 30,
Subsequently, (75) and (76) imply
This completes the proof.
Further Generalization to Random Initial States
This section extends the results to a more general model with random initial states. For agent A i , its dynamics are given by
The initial states of the agents are given by
The sequence {ξ i , i ≥ 1} consists of independent random variables which are also independent of the Browian motions
For fixedū, we consider the FBSDE
, and y o i (T ) = −Hx o i (T ). Except the random initial state, this FBSDE has the same form as (36) .
For the current situation where the filtration is not generated only by the Brownian motions, the proof of Lemma 12 is not applicable. The solution procedure of (P2) as presented in Section 3.5 is only heuristically applied to derive (77). Nevertheless, we can study (77) directly and use it to construct decentralized strategies. We still define (i) (77) has a unique solution in L 2
Proof. (i) Consider (36) by settinḡ
Further construct the ODE by taking expectation in (36) : 
where φ(T ) = 0. We solve (φ, ζ o i ) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R 2n ), and further obtain ( 
Next, we adapt the proofs of Lemmas 26-30 taking into account the random initial states satisfying (H0). This gives the desired estimate for ε N .
Conclusion
This paper introduces a class of mean field LQG games with drift uncertainty. By using the idea of robust optimization, the local strategy is designed by minimizing the worst case cost. When the decentralized strategies are implemented in a finite population, their performance is characterized as a robust ε-Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we only deal with drift uncertainty. If the Brownian motions are also subject to an uncertain coefficient process to model volatility uncertainty [38] , the resulting optimal control problems will give a set of more complicated FBSDE. It is also of potential interest to address model uncertainty of the mean field game in a different setup by considering measure uncertainty [16, 36, 48] in the robust optimization problem. This will necessitate the use of different techniques for analysis. 
